Ayatollah Khamenei had a particular obsession with poetry. This was an open secret, and everyone who knew him noted it in their own way—from Ahmad Shamlo, who famously dismissed him, to the poets in his inner circle who never spoke of him in any terms other than sheer flattery.

Following his rise to power and the relative consolidation of his position in the early 1990s—which coincided with the elimination of prominent literary figures in the so-called “Chain Murders”—Khamenei focused on establishing foundational cultural institutions. He sought to oversee these setups with as little mediation as possible. Funding increases and the strengthening of the Hozeh Honari (the artistic wing of the Islamic Development Organization) were among his first moves. During those same years, schools were identified as a critical battleground, and a highly organized effort was launched to take control of this sector of the artistic community.

The regular staging of poetry competitions and talent scouting were the first operational steps. Subsequently, poetry workshops were mandated across regional departments of education to enforce ideological uniformity. This birthed a new generation of young poets raised entirely within the regime’s propaganda apparatus. Alongside these efforts, reciting poetry in the presence of the former Leader was framed as the ultimate benchmark of success for this generation.

Ali Moallem, Hossein Ahi, Gheysar Aminpour, Yousefali Mirshakak, and Hamid Sabzevari were among Khamenei’s close circle and permanent fixtures at these poetry readings during those years. The sessions initially drew around forty attendees, but the number gradually swelled to nearly 150. The composition of the organizing committee also shifted over time; those who fell out of favor were sidelined. Nevertheless, during those years, Alireza Ghazveh remained a core organizer of these gatherings. The addition of figures like Amiri Esfandagheh, Naser Feyz, and Fazel Nazari during that period was also significant, aimed at generating propaganda value and cultivating popularity.

Amiri Esfandagheh, whom many considered a modern, intellectual poet, directly headed the “Shahrestan Adab” institute—an association whose name is familiar to anyone active in Iranian poetry. This institution served as an entry point for young, fame-seeking poets, where they were subjected to the ideological machinery of the Islamic Republic through various means. Most of the poets selected to read at the Leader’s residence were, in fact, vetted through this very circle.

Mohsen Momeni Sharif, then-head of the Hozeh Honari, detailed the selection process for these residential sessions in an interview with ISNA news agency:

“Numerous factors are considered when selecting poets. One of the red lines is the actual poetic merit of their work, which the Leader emphasized during the sessions. Furthermore, poems written in praise of him are explicitly barred from being read at the gathering.” He added, “Every year, 3,000 poets are identified through various channels—including websites, blogs, news agencies, books, and literary sessions. Based on various criteria, 150 of these poets are chosen to meet the Leader, and only a select few among the invitees actually get to recite poetry in front of Ayatollah Khamenei.”

This account clearly demonstrates the massive, sprawling apparatus that had to be maintained and the exorbitant costs incurred just so a handful of individuals could recite poetry at a session to please “the Leader.”

In the publishing sector, numerous filters were erected as impassable barriers for independent poets. The censorship apparatus at the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance consisted of poets approved by Khamenei—either directly or through proxies like Alireza Ghazveh and Yousefali Mirshakak. In those years, well-known figures like Mohammad Ali Bahmani were also members of this censorship board. Although these individuals nominally operated behind the scenes, whispers regarding their identities frequently circulated within literary circles.

Saeid Biabanaki was one of the poets tasked with censorship and vetting during those years. He was among those who claimed to hold a critical view of Iran’s literary landscape, attempting to introduce a new approach to classical Persian poetry by addressing social issues. However, his membership on the vetting board of the Ministry of Guidance and his blatant opposition to freedom of expression revealed his true stance toward art.

Analyzing the premeditated and systematic approach of the Islamic Republic’s vast propaganda machinery is a task that far exceeds a few reports. However, what was clearly evident was the regime’s absolute determination to dominate this field—specifically poetry and music. This sector remains one of the most critical components of an apparatus catering to a largely traditional society. A glaring example of this phenomenon is Fazel Nazari; despite the public’s awareness of his background and alignment with the state, a traditional and romantic audience still gravitated toward him. A full critique of this state-sponsored poet’s work falls outside the scope of this article; however, the author intends to examine the strategic and ideological dimensions of such figures in future pieces, exploring how they worked to solidify a literary framework designed to serve the regime.